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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE INSURANCE FUND,
Plaintiff,

vs.

Case No.

10219
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
OF UTAH, and JAMES F.
TAYLOR, and UNITED PARK
CITY MINES COMPANY,
Defendants.

PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF

NATURE OF THE CASE
This case calls for the Supreme Court of Utah
to review the Industrial Commission's proceedings
and decision awarding benefits to James F. Taylor
under the Utah Occupational Disease Disability
Law, for the purpose of determining whether the
Commission exceeded its powers in making such
award, and whether the Commission's findings of
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fact are supported by substantial, competent evidence having probative value.

DISPOSITION BEFORE THE
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
James F. Taylor filed an Occupational Disease
Claim of Employee with the Industrial Commission
dated May 9, 1962. On August 6, 1963, pursuant to
Order and Notice the Industrial Commission held a
hearing on the application. Thereafter, pursuant
to a Motion for Supplemental Hearing (R48, 49),
the Commission issued its Order granting the said
Motion ( R50), and by said Order gave notice to the
State Insurance Fund that it might desire to present
evidence upon the issue of its liability as carrier.
Thereafter, an order setting the time and place for
the further hearing (R-51) was made and entered
setting the time .for the second hearing on the 30th
day of December, 1963 at 11:00 a.m. The hearing
was held on that date. On June 15, 1964 the Commission rendered its decision and order in which it
was found that James F. Taylor was 1001o disabled
because of silicosis based upon the disabling effects
of silicosis and that he was entitled to have the
United Park City Mines Company and the State
Insurance Fund pay him $15,415.00 compensation
benefits at the rate of $41.75 per week beginning
February 9, 1963 and continuing until a total of
$15,415.00 has been paid, together with medical and
hospital benefits. The order also required the State
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Insurance Fund to pay the said benefits as the insurance carrier for the United Park City Mines
Company.
RELIEF SOUGHT IN PETITION
The Plaintiff, The State Insurance Fund, in
this review of proceedings seeks to have the Supreme
Court reverse, vacate and annuli the award which
the Industrial Commission made to James F. Taylor
insofar as it relates to the liability of the State Insurance Fund to pay the benefits as set forth in the
Order above described.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
James F. Taylor commenced working as a
miner in 1925 ( R-56) . He left actual underground
work for the Silver King Mine "around in the '40s
or '39, I think." (R-57). He was employed as a surface watchman between January 31, 1939 to July
1, 1950, and again between July 16, 1950 and August
15, 1952, and from October 22, 1954 to June 30,
1961. The last time he worked as a watchman it
was for seven days only from February 3, 1962 to
February 8, 1962. All of this period of time his employment was that of a surface watchman (R-116).
The record is clear that at least since 1941, he had
not been employed in underground mining. (R-61)
The last seven days of employment was that
of a night watchman when he filled in for Moon
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Q. So you noted that you had a definite
shortness of breath at that time?
A. Yes.
Q. And you were unable in fact to carry
on work as an underground miner at that
time?
A. That's right.
Q. Did you have any trouble with arthritis at that time?
A. Well, I had it, but I would always go
to work.
Q. And did that condition - shortness
of breath, and tendency to fatigue- become
worse, or was it a fairly static condition?
A. It became worse at times.
Q. As time went on, it became worse?
A. Yes.
Q. Would you say that by the time you
went to work for the Daly Judge Mine, it
had gotten about as bad as it got?
A. Well, it got a little worse after the
last years there.
Q. The last year or two?
A. (Nodding head in the affirmative.)
Q. But it was very difficult for you to
carry on the work during the last, oh, from
1959 on; is that correct?
A. That's right.
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Q. Did you go to a doctor about this condition at all?
A. Yes.
Q. Who did you consult about it?
A. Well, here a while back - last winter - I went to Dr. Barta first. He told me
I had silicosis.
Q. When did you first consult him?
A. That was around '33, I think it was.
Something like that.
Q. Dr. Barta, back in 1933, told you
that you had silicosis?
A. (Nodding head in the affirmative.)
Q. And what other doctors did you consult, in order of the time that you consulted
them, about your condition?
A. I went to Dr. Onike when I went to
work
. for United Park. He told me I had sili-

COSIS.

Q. And when was that?
A. 1952. I went to Dr. Openshaw here,
and he told me I had silicosis, too.
Q. And when was that?
A. I think that was about '43 or '44.
Somewhere around there, I think.

Q. Did these gentlemen suggest to you
that you ought not to continue to work in the
mines?
A. That's right. Dr. Openshaw sure did.
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It may be claimed that Applicant's cause of
action did not arise until he became disabled and
unable to work as alleged, however, Section 35-2-56
provides for permanent partial disability from occupational disease. Certainly it cannot be said that
Mr. Taylor was not partially disabled by reason of
the disease as it was impossible for him to work
underground, and he was advised that he ought not
to continue working in the mine. Dr. Openshaw
and Dr. Onike told him he had silicosis and that he
should not continue to work in the mine (R-82, 83).
It was very difficult for him to carry on work from
1959 on. This question was asked of Mr. Taylor and
he advised that that was right. (R-82)
The provisions of Section 35-2-56 which provide for the payment of permanent partial disability
compensation for occupational diseases was incorporated in the law in 1949. It cannot be said that
the Applicant after that date did not have ample
opportunity to properly present his claim for permanent partial disability due to silicosis. It also appears abundantly clear that under the provisions of
the limitation statute above set forth that his claim
should have been presented at least within one year
following 1952 when he was told by Dr. Onike that
he had silicosis, and that he ought not to continue
to work in the mines.
Although we do not have a Utah silicosis case
which involves the above-mentioned limitations statute, we do have a Utah case involving an occupational disease which does interpret the section.
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In the case of State Insurance Fund v. Industrial Commission, et al., 116 U. 279, 209 P. 2d. 558,
this Court carefully considered the provisions of
Section 35-2-48, U.C.A., 1953, which at that time
was known as Section 42-1a-49, U.C.A., 1943.
In that case Elbert I. Lunnen laid off from his
work as a welder in a foundry after twenty-two
years of employment. He was almost continuously
exposed to harmful fumes. During the last five
or six years of his employment he suffered from
shortness of breath. During the time he was employed he repeatedly called his condition to the attention of his employer and on occasions he was off
work from three to eight days at a time.
He was laid off from his employment on February 8th at which time he considered his disability
to be only temporary, but he believed that it was
due to his exposure to harmful fumes during his
employment. He was aware of the fact that his disability might be compensable under the Act because
he visited the Industrial Commission. His first doctor apparently did not realize the seriousness of his
condition, but his second doctor advised him that his
disability was total and permanent and that it was
compensable under our Act.
This case was not a silicosis case, but it was
based upon a disease other than silicosis, which required the written claim to be filed within sixty
days after the cause of action arose. This Court
said in construing the above-mentioned statute
the following, at Page 283, Utah Reports:
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The better rule which is in accord with
reason and justice, is that a cause of action does not arise until an ascertainable
disability and compensable disability results.
This is the rule adopted in California. See
Marsh v. Industrial Accident Commission,

*** .

And again at Page 284, Utah reports:
The cause of action arises in this kind
of a case when the employee suffers compensable disability under the act and could
by reasonable diligence ascertain that his
disability was employment caused and by its
nature compensable. That ignorance of the
requirements of the law does not postpone
the accrual of a cause of action.
And again on Page 285, Utah reports :
But if, on account of his own failure to
press his case, or have a complete examination made under circumstances which would
reasonably put him on notice that he was
probably entitled to compensation, he failed
to discover that his disability was compensable, then the fault is his own and he cannot
recover.
On Page 286, Utah Reports, Justice Wolf in
writing a concurring opinion, had this to say:
Such holding does not permit the employee, by failing to demand payment, to
postpone the accrual of the cause of action
indefinitely, nor does it in the case where one
of several successive employers may be liable,
permit the cause of action to arise before it
can be ascertained which employer is liable.
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There are numerous cases from other jurisdictions which are helpful and have discussed the
question as to when the statute of limitations commences to run.
The California doctrine is that for the purposes of the limitation statute, the "injury" set
forth in the compensation statute occurred when the
accumulated effects culminate in a disability traceable to the latent disease as a primary cause and in
those cases whereby the exercise of reasonable care
and diligence by the Applicant it is discoverable
and apparent that a compensable injury has occurred or has been sustained.
See Marsh vs. Industrial Accident Commission,
217 Cal. 338, 18 P. 2d. 933, 86 ALR 563.
In this case three separate matters were consolidated for consideration. In the Court's opinion
at Page 938, 18 P. 2d. is the following:
From our study of the subject we are
brought to the conclusion that in the case
of a latent and progressive disease, such as
pneumoconiosis, it cannot reasonably be said
that the injury dates necessarily from the
last day of exposure to a dust-laden atmosphere and that the prescriptive period begins
to run from that date. Rather, according to
our view, should the date of the injury be
deemed the time when the accumulated effects culminate in a disability traceable to
the latent disease as a primary cause, and by
the exercise of reasonable care and diligence
it is discoverable and apparent that a com-
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pensable injury was sustained in performance of the duties of the employment. (Emphasis ours)
In the Marsh case the Court, in reaching its
conclusion, fixed the beginning of the running of
the limitation statue as of the date the deceased
was first disabled from work. The Court held that
there should be further proceedings to ascertain
when the statute of limitations had begun to run
in conformance with the rule above set forth.
This California rule was again stated in State
of California, Subsequent Injuries Fund, Petitioner
v. Industrial Accident Commission of the State of
California, 304 P. 2d. 112 at Page 114, where the
Court said:
The date of injury in cases of occupational disease is that date upon which the
employee first suffered disability therefrom,
and either knew, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known, that
that disability was caused by his present or
prior employment.
In Hutchinson v. Semler, 361 P. 2d. 803, 227
Ore. 437 decided May 10, 1961, rehearing denied
June 14, 1961, 362 P. 2d. 704, the Court said at
Page 807, 361 P. 2d.:
In it he mentioned developments in the
operation of the defendant's laboratory which
he said caused the dust condition of the room
in which he worked to become acute. He re·
lated the efforts which he then made to per-
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suade the defendant to provide better ventilation. That occurred in the first part of '56,
so he swore. He also described the illness
which came upon him and the manner in
which his health deteriorated. He dwelled
upon the fact that his lungs became effected
and declared that 'My breathing was very
bad.' Shortly he found himself engaged in
coughing. According to him he felt 'rundown, weak condition.' '***I thought maybe
that I was tired and run-down and worn-out.'
He added that, "If I walked two or three
blocks at a normal rate I would be winded.'
He attributed his ill health to the dust which
he said was in the air of the room where he
worked. He swore that the air in the room
at times became so laden with dust that he
could not see the walls and was compelled to
withdraw to a nearby hallway until the dust
had settled.
When the plaintiff was asked to specify
the time when he noticed his symptoms of ill
health, he replied with expressions that lend
themselves to more than one signification of
time. According to him, he noticed his ill
health, 'I'd say three, three and a half years'
from the time that he entered the defendant's
employ which he stated occurred in 'the spring
of 1953'.
In deciding that the judgment of the Circuit
Court was affirmed which held that the statute
of limitations began to run when the plaintiff became aware of accumulated effects of the harmful
dust, the Court stated the following:
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We concur in the rule enunciated in the
Urie case and believe that our prior decisions
are in accord with it. Thus, the statute of
limitations began to run in the case at bar
when the Plaintiff became apprised, or as a
reasonable man should have known, that his
health was being undermined by the dust he
was breathing.
It is interesting to note that Mr. Taylor in the
case now before the Court, testified to similar conditions and that he had similar ailments as those
claimed by the Applicant in Hutchinson vs. Semler
(supra).
The Wisconsin case of Universal Granite Quarries Companies vs. Industrial Commission, 224 Wis.
680, 272 N.W. 863, held that the failure of the
Applicant to make a claim for compensation "within two years from the time when he became aware
of his condition, and the cause of it" barred his
claim.
Mr. Taylor cannot be heard to say that he was
not aware of his condition nor that he was somewhat disabled when he testified that commencing in
1941 he no longer worked underground and that
he worked on the surface because he was having
difficulty. (R-80) He also testified that he knew
that he had silicosis because he had been told on
more than one occasion, by his examining and attending doctors, that he had this disease. (R-82 83)
Certainly the statute of limitations should be held
to have run. He had the right to file a claim for
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silicosis under the partial disability act at any time
after that act went into effect. Certainly it cannot be said that Mr. Taylor was not partially disabled because he was unable to perform his regular
duties and had to take jobs which entailed something other than underground mining.
We submit that Defendant Taylor, knew, years
ago that he had silicosis and that as a result thereof
he had disability, and that therefore his claim should
be held to be barred.

Point 2
JAMES F. TAYLOR WAS NOT EXPOSED
TO HARMFUL EMPLOYMENT DURING
A PERIOD OF THIRTY DAYS AFTER THE
POLICY OF INSURANCE ISSUED BY THE
STATE INSURANCE FUND BECAME
EFFECTIVE.
We do not in presenting this point, agree that
James F. Taylor was, at any time during the period
that he worked for the United Park City Mines
Company after the policy of insurance issued to
the United Park City Mines Company by the State
Insurance Fund went into effect, exposed to a harmful quantity of silicon dioxide dust.
As hereinbefore set forth the United Park City
Mines Company was self-insured until December 1,
1961. Following this date the State Insurance
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to the date incapacity began. See Inre Johnson, 217 Mass. 388, 104 N. E. 735, Case of
Bergeron, 243 Mass. 366, 137 N. E. 739;
Case of Johnson, 279 Mass. 481, 181 N. E.
761. Where, in the case of a cumulative
cause of injury there has been a change of
insurer, it has been deemed essential that the
employee, in order to establish the liability
of the later insurer to pay compensation,
prove the existence of a causal relation between the employment during the period
covered by its policy and the employee's injury. Case of Fabrizio, 274 Mass. 352, 174
N. E. 720; Case of Langford, 278 Mass. 461,
463, 180. N. E. 228; Case of De Filippo, 284
Mass. 531, 534, ( 188 N. E. 245). The implication is that where no such causal relation
exists the employee's injury which results in
his incapacity is to be regarded as having occurred prior to that period and not at the date
incapacity began.
In the very recent case of The State Insurance
Fund v. The Industrial Commission et al case No.
10095 this Court in discussing the above-quoted
section pointed out that the statute requires employment throughout a 30-day period and harmful
exposure during that period of 30-day employment.
This Court said :
This provision does not require that the
employee actually work each day of the 30day period, nor that he be harmfully exposed
each day of such period, it only requires
harmful exposure and employment "during
a period of 30 days." It would be very un-
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usual to have 30 working days or 30 days of
harmful exposure during such a period. The
obvious meaning of this statute is that it requires employment throughout this period
and also harmful exposure during the period
but does not require actual working or actual
exposure each day of such period.
We submit that the decision in the above-cited
case is controlling in this case in that Taylor was
not employed during 30-days after the policy of
The State Insurance Fund became effective. He was
in fact employed for only a seven-day period, all
of the days being in succession.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the decision and
order of the Industrial Commission insofar as it
relates to The State Insurance Fund, should be
annulled.
'Respectfully submitted,
Charles Welch, Jr.
Attorney for Plaintiff
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